Toxic confusion: the dilemma of antibiotic regulation in West German food production (1951–1990)  by Kirchhelle, Claas
Toxic confusion: the dilemma of
antibiotic regulation in West German
food production (1951–1990)
Claas Kirchhelle
University of Oxford, Wellcome Unit for the History of Medicine, 45-47 Banbury Road, United Kingdom
Endeavour Vol. 40 No. 2 Full text provided by www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirectIn November 2014, the German weekly Die Zeit confronted
readers with a disturbing image. Staring at each other
across the title page were a friendly looking pig and a human
wearing a surgeon’s mask. The image was titled ‘‘Revenge
From the Sty.’’1 Inside the issue, numerous articles warned
about the overuse of antibiotics on German farms and the
dire health effects of resistant pathogens. The November
issue of Zeit marked the beginning of a series of Zeit reports
dedicated to bacterial resistance and hygiene problems in
food production and hospitals. According to Correct!v, the
reporter collective behind many of the articles, the three
most common multi-resistant pathogens (MRSA, ESBL,
and VRE) were annually responsible for over 30,000 deaths
and at least 1,000,000 infections in German hospitals. How-
ever, resistant bacteria were not limited to hospitals. Since
the early 2000s, multi-resistant LA-MRSA CC398 had
spread rapidly throughout German sties. In the intensive
animal husbandry regions of Northern Germany, almost
every third detected colonisation of humans with MRSA was
defined as ‘‘livestock-associated’’ and almost 10% of infec-
tions detected in humans were caused by LA-MRSA CC398.
Accordingly, the Zeit accused farmers and veterinarians of
overusing antibiotics and endangering public health for the
sake of cheap meat and quick profits.2
In response, furious farmers and veterinarians picketed
the Zeit building in Hamburg. However, farmers failed to
win public sympathy. In a 2014 Zeit interview, Minister of
Agriculture Christian Schmidt went so far as to suggest
restricting veterinary prescription rights. Six months lat-
er, the German government passed a new one-health based
strategy to reduce bacterial resistance (DART 2020).31 ‘Die Rache aus dem Stall’, Zeit (48/2014).
2 ‘Diese Keime to¨ten’, ZeitOnline, 20.11.2014, URL: http://www.zeit.de/wissen/
gesundheit/2014-11/
multiresistente-keime-mrsa-antibiotika-massentierhaltung-keimkarte (accessed:
20.04.2015); ‘Das bringt uns noch um’, Zeit (48/2014), pp. 21–24; Christian Fuchs:
‘Dauernd Stoff vom Arzt’, ZeitOnline, 27.11.2014, URL: http://www.zeit.de/2014/49/
antibiotika-im-fleisch-tiermedizin/komplettansicht (accessed: 20.04.2015).
3 ‘Landwirte und Tiera¨rzte protestieren vor Zeit-Geba¨ude’, Zeitonline, 28.11.2014,
URL: http://www.zeit.de/hamburg/politik-wirtschaft/2014-11/antibiotika-
bauerverband-protest (accessed: 20.04.2015); ‘Fu¨ r uns nicht akzeptabel’, ZeitOnline,
17.12.2014, URL: http://www.zeit.de/2014/52/landwirtschaftsminister-christian-
schmidt-massentierhaltung-antibiotika-politik (accessed: 20.04.2015); ‘Dart
2020. Antibiotika-Resistenzen Beka¨mpfen Zum Wohl Von Mensch Und Tier’
(Bundesregierung Deutschland, 2015).
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.endeavour.2016.03.005How did it come to a situation where farmers were
picketing newspapers and politicians were questioning
veterinarians’ prescription rights? Now focussing primari-
ly on bacterial resistance, German controversies about
agricultural antibiotics are sixty-four years old. In 1951,
antibiotics’ mass-introduction to West German agriculture
enabled an unprecedented boom of animal production. It
did not take long for side effects to emerge. Agricultural
antibiotic use could cause residues in food and the envi-
ronment, enable substandard welfare conditions, and se-
lect for bacterial resistance.
Faced with these hazards, Germans had to decide how
to regulate the former miracle substances. However, dif-
ferent antibiotic hazards entail different regulatory
responses: whereas it is sufficient to enforce drug with-
drawal times to prevent residues in animal tissues and
upgrade husbandry methods to improve welfare, only a
permanent reduction of antibiotic use will curb bacterial
resistance. Regulations’ shapes thus depend on which risks
societies are most concerned about: residues in food, resis-
tant pathogens, or maltreated animals.
Establishing antibiotic risk priorities is not straightfor-
ward. According to the sociologist Ulrich Beck, the modern
category of risk has substituted absolute truth with hun-
dreds of relative truths. Risk’s virtual, probability based,
anticipatory nature means that everything can be but
nothing is risky. Risk is the anticipation of catastrophe
but not the actual catastrophe. The anticipatory dimension
of risk influences human expectations and triggers actions
designed to avoid anticipated outcomes.4 Because of risk’s
half-known, anticipatory nature, objective measurements
and authoritative expertise do not exist: ‘‘no one is an
expert or everyone is an expert.’’5 Ultimately, wider cul-
tural evaluations decide whether a risk is seen as danger-
ous, urgent, real, or negligible. According to Beck, the
‘‘objectivity of a risk is the product of its perception and
its staging. . . .. The risks we think we perceive and which4 Ulrich Beck, Weltrisikogesellschaft. Auf Der Suche Nach Der Verlorenen Sicherheit
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007), pp. 22–36.
5 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modern-
ization’, in Ulrich Beck (ed.), Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aes-
thetics in the Modern Social Order (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), p. 9.
pen access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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perceptions.’’6
The concept of risk developed by Beck and others has
given rise to a rich vein of literature on the commodification
and distribution of risk and the changing and contested
evaluation of risky substances and technologies.7 Some
studies have stressed how distinct ways of producing knowl-
edge have structured different ways of regulating risk.
Focussing mainly on politics, legal systems, and experts,
Sheila Jasanoff has highlighted how distinct ‘‘civic epis-
temologies’’ have produced different evaluations of contro-
versial technologies in the US and Europe. Meanwhile,
Alexander von Schwerin has pointed to the formation of
risk epistemes amongst groups of scientists and resulting
evaluations and representations of risk and risk policies.
However, neither Jasanoff nor Schwerin extend their anal-
ysis to the wider cultural staging and evaluation of risks
amongst consumers and lay users of risky technologies.8
This paper supplements research on civic epistemolo-
gies and risk epistemes with a focus on the development
and impact of popular vernacular risk cultures.9 Building
on the work of Heiko Stoff, Alexander von Schwerin, and
Ulrike Thoms,10 this paper will show how the West Ger-
man regulation of agricultural antibiotics was influenced
by a widespread cultural Angst of adulteration and poison-
ing via invisible substances. By analysing reports in the
national media, responses by the agricultural press, and6 Beck, Weltrisikogesellschaft. Auf Der Suche Nach Der Verlorenen Sicherheit, p. 36.
7 Christian Simon, Ddt. Kulturgeschichte Einer Chemischen Verbindung (Basel:
Christian Merian Verlag, 1999), Natalie Jas, ‘Public Health and Pesticide Regulation
in France before and after Silent Spring’, History and Technology, 23/4 (2007), Carsten
Reinhardt, ‘Boundary Values’, in Viola Balz et al. (eds.), Precarious Matters/Preka¨re
Stoffe. The History of Dangerous and Endangered Substances in the 19th and 20th
Centuries (Berlin: Max Plack Institute for the History of Science, 2008 [Preprint]),
Nancy Langston, Toxic Bodies. Hormone Disruptors and the Legacy of Des (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 2010), Karin Zachmann, ‘Atoms for Peace and
Radiation for Safety—How to Build Trust in Irradiated Foods in Cold War Europe and
Beyond’, History and Technology, 27/1 (2011), Sarah A. Vogel, Is It Safe? Bpa and the
Struggle to Define the Safety of Chemicals (Berkeley at al.: University of California
Press, 2013).
8 Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe & the
United States (2 edn.; Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p.
9, Alexander Von Schwerin, ‘Preka¨re Stoffe: Radiumo¨konomie, Risikoepisteme Und
Die Etablierung Der Radioindikatortechnik in Der Zeit Des Nationalsozialismus’,
NTM. International Journal of History & Ethics of Natural Sciences Technology &
Medicine, 17 (2009), p. 6.
9 Arwen P. Mohun, Risk. Negotiating Safety in American Society (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2013), pp. 3–6.
10 Ulrike Thoms, ‘Between Promise and Threat. Antibiotics in Foods in West
Germany 1950–1980’, NTM, 20 (2012), Heiko Stoff, ‘Vital Regulators of Efficiency:
The German Concept of Wirkstoffe, 1900–1950’, in Alexander Von Schwerin, Heiko
Stoff, and Bettina Wahrig (eds.), Biologics, a History of Agents Made from Living
Organisms in the Twentieth Century (London and Brookfield: Picerking and Chatto,
2013), Alexander Von Schwerin, ‘Vom Gift Im Essen Zu Chronischen Umweltgefah-
ren. Lebensmittelzusatzstoffe Und Die Risikopolitische Institutionalisierung Der
Toxikogenetik in Der Bundesrepublik, 1955–1964’, Technikgeschichte, 81/3 (2014),
Heiko Stoff, ‘Zur Kritik Der Chemisierung Und Technisierung Der Umwelt. Risiko-
Und Pra¨ventionspolitik Von Lebensmittelzusatzstoffen in Den 1950er Jahren’, ibid,
Heiko Stoff, ‘Oestrogens and Butter Yellow: Gendered Policies of Contamination in
Germany 1930–1970’, in Teresa Ortiz-Go´mez and Maria Jesu´s Santesmases (eds.),
Gender and Well-Being: Gendered Drugs and Medicine. Historical and Socio-Culture
Perspectives (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), Heiko Stoff, Gift in Der Nahrung. Zur Genese
Der Verbraucherpolitik Mitte Des 20. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag,
2015).; the paper also builds on non-German histories of agricultural antibiotic use in
Mark R. Finlay, ‘Hogs, Antibiotics, and the Industrial Environments of Postwar
Agriculture’, in Philip Scranton and Susan R. Schrepfer (eds.), Industrializing Organ-
isms. Introducing Evolutionary History (Hagley Perspectives on Business and Cul-
ture; London: Routledge, 2004), Robert Bud, Penicillin: Triumph and Tragedy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 163–90, Kendra Smith-Howard, ‘Antibiotics and
Agricultural Change: Purifying Milk and Protecting Health in the Postwar Era’,
Agricultural History Society, 84/3 (2010), Thoms, ‘Between Promise and Threat.
Antibiotics in Foods in West Germany 1950–1980’.
www.sciencedirect.comdecision-making by scientists and the federal government,
it will become clear that West Germans’ Angst had deep-
seated cultural-linguistic roots. Commonly referred to as
Chemie (chemistry/chemicals) or—even worse—Gift (poi-
son),11 many Germans associated agricultural antibiotics
more with familiar toxic or carcinogenic chemicals and
additives than with their use in medicine.
In turn, this toxicity- and carcinogen-focussed vernacu-
lar Angst influenced both scientific risk epistemes and
regulatory decision-making. Whereas the public’s Che-
mie-focus led to an early ban of antibiotic food preservation
and an impressive residue-monitoring program, it also
reduced political pressure for measures to combat bacterial
resistance proliferation. Following a brief 1970s spurt of
resistance-inspired regulation, West German attempts to
address resistance proliferation remained stunted. Ger-
many’s focus on residues changed only gradually after
reunification and led to a ban of antibiotic growth promo-
ters (AGPs) by 2006. It is telling that in the context of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the Ger-
man public seems to be more concerned about ‘‘toxic’’ US
Chlorha¨hnchen (chlorinated chickens) than about permis-
sive American antibiotic regulations.12
It’s a toxic world: West German antibiotic regulation
1945–1971
Although farmers were already using antimicrobial sulpho-
namides during the interwar period, it was not until the
discovery of the so-called antibiotic growth effect that anti-
biotics’ mass-introduction to Western agriculture truly be-
gan. Publishing their findings in 1950, Thomas Jukes and E.
L. Stockstad found that if consumed at low (subtherapeutic)
doses, many antibiotics allowed animals to process feeds
more efficiently and grow quicker. In addition to providing
significant feedstuff savings, AGPs also promised to control
bacterial herd infections. This latter effect was particularly
important in the increasingly densely populated postwar
sties.13
Whereas AGPs soon became extremely popular on US
farms, West German antibiotic consumption initially
lagged behind. After average daily caloric intake had fallen
to 1100 calories during the ‘‘hunger-winter’’ of 1946–47,
German officials attempted to boost food production whilst
reintegrating thousands of refugees into the country’s
damaged fabric. As a consequence, many of the 11,571
new farms created in West Germany by 1950 were no
bigger than ten hectares and not specialised on animal
production. Although West Germany licensed antibiotics
as ‘‘substances with special effect’’ for feeds in 1951, these
were hardly conditions in which AGP use could flourish.1411 Stoff, Gift in Der Nahrung. Zur Genese Der Verbraucherpolitik Mitte Des 20. Jahr-
hunderts, p. 12.
12 ‘Verbraucherschutz—Beho¨rde ha¨lt Chlorhu¨ hnchen fu¨ r Unbedenklich’, SpiegelOn-
line, 10.06.2014, URL: http://www.spiegel.de/gesundheit/diagnose/chlorhuehnchen- ist-
laut-bfr-und-efsa-nicht-gesundheitsschaedlich-a-974342.html (accessed: 05.05.2015).
13 Bud, Penicillin: Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 168–69, Finlay, ‘Hogs, Antibiotics, and
the Industrial Environments of Postwar Agriculture’, pp. 244–54.
14 Alois Seidl, Deutsche Agrargeschichte (Frankfurt a. M.: DLG Verlag, 2006), p. 271;
75; 77. Uwe Petersen, ‘Entwicklungen Im Deutschen Futtermittelrecht’, in Bundes-
forschungsanstalt Fu¨ r Landwirtschaft (Fal) (ed.), Meilensteine Fu¨ r Die Futtermittel-
sicherheit: Vortragsveranstaltung Im Forum Der Fal Am 16./17. November 2006
(Braunschweig: Petersen, Uwe et al., 2007), p. 3.
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Kulturkritik of American mass culture,15 West German
planners looked to the US for ways to intensify agriculture.
During the early 1950s, enthusiastic agricultural media
reports and exchange programs led many younger farmers
to embrace US farming methods.16 Changes were particu-
larly dramatic in the livestock sector where renewed access
to international markets and cheap grain prices made
many farmers concentrate entirely on animal production.
By 1953–54, 70% of West German agricultural earnings
resulted from selling animal products. Animal production
was further fuelled by West Germany’s economic take-off
and concomitant Fresswelle (wave of gluttony). Whereas
the average West German ate 37 kg of meat in 1950, this
figure had doubled to 74 kg in 1968.17
In order to supply growing demand during times of
rising labour costs and international competition, farmers
began to invest in labour saving intensive animal produc-
tion systems. Pioneered in the US, these year-round facto-
ry-like systems relied on regular antibiotic use to maintain
herd health rather than veterinary treatment of individual
animals. Unsurprisingly, both the US High Commission
and American manufacturers propagated the adoption of
US agricultural technology and sold production licenses
for AGPs to West German companies.18
By the early 1960s, agricultural antibiotics had become
a fixture in West German sties. In farming magazines,
articles and commercials praised AGPs, antibiotic thera-
pies, and numerous other applications.19 In 1966, the
Minister of Agriculture estimated that about 80% of mixed
feeds for young pigs, veal calves, and poultry contained
antibiotic additives. AGPs remained banned for egg laying
poultry, feeder cattle, and dairy cows.20 Although thera-
peutic doses were restricted to veterinary prescriptions,
prescription-free AGPs could contain penicillin, spiramy-
cin, oleandomycin, oxytetracycline, chlortetracycline, tet-
racycline, and bacitracin.21 By 1968, experts calculated15 Cathryn Carson, ‘Bildung Als Konsumgut: Physik in Der Westdeutschen Nachk-
riegskultur’, in Dieter Hoffmann (ed.), Physik Im Nachkriegsdeutschland (Frankfurt:
Harri Deutsch, 2003).
16 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Bavarian Main State Archive)[In the following
HSTA] Ministerium fu¨ r Erna¨hrung Landwirtschaft und Forsten (MELF)-365 B22-
1159/5641 UA. Betriebswirtschaft und Agrarpolitik an Ministerialrat Dr. Nichterlein
(22.12.1952); ‘Der Fortschritt in der Landwirtschaft’, supplement of the Bayerisches
Landwirtschaftliches Wochenblatt (BLW) (2/1950); ‘Amerikanischer Austausch-Jung-
bauer. Ben Coleman traf in Bayern ein’, BLW (31/1950), p. 62; ‘Farmerleben in Neu-
England (Amerika)’, BLW (35/1950), p. 667.
17 ‘Tierische Erzeugnisse bestimmen den Erlo¨s’, BLW (18/1955), p. 797; HJ Teute-
berg, ‘Die Entwicklung des Fleischverbrauchs in Deutschland’, GESIS HISTAT:
historische Statistik, ZA8303, (1972 [2008]), URL: http://www.gesis.org/histat/de/
search (accessed: 21.04.2015); Thoms, ‘Between Promise and Threat. Antibiotics in
Foods in West Germany 1950–1980’, p. 189.
18 Finlay, ‘Hogs, Antibiotics, and the Industrial Environments of Postwar Agricul-
ture’, pp. 239–44; HSTA Ministerium des Innern (MInn) 87547, Bd.I, 5568 a5, Office of
the US High Commission for Germany to Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern
(06.03.1950); 5568 Lederle Laboratories Division to Wilhelm Pschorr (06.10.1949);
HSTA MELF -366, 6004/c5 Prof. Dr. Sommer an Ministerialdirektor Du¨ rrwaechter
(17.01.1958), pp. 7–8; Thoms, ‘Between Promise and Threat. Antibiotics in Foods in
West Germany 1950–1980’, p. 198.
19 G. Fiegenbaum, ‘Mutterlose Ferkelaufzucht—eine einfache und preiswerte
Methode’, LWWL (10/1964), p. 26; D. Lohmann, ‘Vorbeugung ist besser als Heilen’,
LWWL (18/1966), pp. 88–89; ‘Lomacin—Commercial: Risiko-minderung’, LWWL (40/
1969), p. 2.
20 HSTA MInn 87762 Anlage zu III 6b – 5594/2–3/66 Deutscher Bundestag –
5. Wahlperiode; Drucksache V/907, p. 16.
21 HSTA MInn 91348/II Anlage zu IAI 23-2-2/470 Vorschlag der Kommission fu¨ r
eine Richtlinie des Rats u¨ ber Zusatzstoffe in der Tiererna¨hrung (Bundesrat; Direktor
Drucksache 410/67, Anlage I, pp. 8–9.
www.sciencedirect.comthat AGPs were annually saving German farmers 300–
400 million marks in feed expenses.22 In 1970, one com-
mentator exclaimed: ‘‘intensive mass-animal husbandry
would be impossible without these mushroom-derived pro-
ducts.’’23
Initially, commentators in the national press also
expressed enthusiasm about antibiotics’ agricultural
applications. Throughout the 1950s, the conservative
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the left-leaning
magazine Der Spiegel, and the liberal Zeit mostly praised
medical and non-medical antibiotic-applications as part
of a new ‘‘chemical age.’’ In 1954, the Spiegel enthused:
‘‘chemotherapeutics are now commonly available, and it
is not much more difficult to kill a bacillus than to swat a
fly.’’24 Despite printing reports about antibiotic allergies
and bacterial resistance in hospitals, early commenta-
tors failed to connect problems to antibiotic use on
farms.25
However, by the second half of the 1950s, more sceptical
comments began to appear. In 1956, the FAZ criticized new
US antibiotic food preservatives: ‘‘The ‘marriage’ between
medication and cutlet seems to us to be too unnatural
to accept without opposition.’’26 The newspaper’s
characterization of antibiotics as unnatural was signifi-
cant. Although manufacturers like Pfizer stressed that
antibiotics were derived from ‘‘natural’’ moulds,27 the Ger-
man public categorised them as artificial Chemie (chemi-
cals/chemistry). In the vernacular risk parlance of West
Germans, agricultural antibiotics were therefore grouped
in close linguistic association with other Chemie like hor-
mones and food dyes. Over the following decades, agricul-
tural antibiotics’ image would be tarnished via linguistic
association with unrelated toxic or carcinogenic sub-
stances.
Fear of Chemie had deep roots in German culture. Since
the nineteenth century Lebensreform, many Germans had
participated in movements emphasizing the benefits of
unadulterated food. During the interwar period, the grow-
ing focus on purer and therefore healthier lifestyles had
given rise to numerous alternative agricultural and die-
tary schools. Common to many Lebensreform movements
was the rejection of artificial Chemie such as fertilisers
and pesticides in favor of ‘‘natural’’ circular farming. For
supporters of alternative nutrition and agriculture, the
adulteration of food and bodies was linked to degenerative
diseases and cancer. German scientists contributed to
these fears by increasingly distinguished between Wirk-
and Fremdstoffe (active and foreign substances) in food.
The Nazis, in their misguided quest for physical and racial
superiority, also adopted elements of Chemie-free
movements. Concerned about adulterated nutrition and22 ‘Alarm im Schweinestall’, Zeit (13/1968), pp. 40–41.
23 ‘Nichts dem Zufall u¨ berlassen’, BLW (02/1970) (special supplement), p. 23.
24 ‘Leckerbissen fu¨ r Viren’, Der Spiegel (13/1954), p. 36; ‘Chemie des Lebens’, Zeit
(28/1958), p. 4; ‘Gefa¨hrlicher Papageienschmuggel u¨ ber Belgien und Holland’, Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 06.09.1956, p. 8.
25 ‘Schock nach der Spritze’, Spiegel (30/1954), pp. 30–31; ‘Wissenschaft ka¨mpft fu¨ r
das Leben’, Zeit (41/1958), p. 5.
26 ‘Antibiotika im Kotelett’, FAZ, 08.08.1956, p. 13.
27 Thoms, ‘Between Promise and Threat. Antibiotics in Foods in West Germany
1950–1980’, p. 184.
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dietary reform campaigns and research.28 However, as
with other ‘‘green streaks’’ of fascism, the Nazi approach to
preventive health and food purity was unsystematic and
contradictory and wartime constraints often led to the
abandonment of long-term health considerations.29
Nonetheless, interwar public and expert concerns about
Chemie left a strong mark on Germans. With many sup-
porters of food purity retaining influential posts, the post-
war years saw a rapid resurgence of public Chemie-fears
and an expert risk episteme firmly focused on the chemical
adulteration of food and bodies. As early as 1949, a warning
about the carcinogenic food dye butter yellow by Nobel
laureate Adolf Butenandt triggered a large-scale letter
campaign to President Theodor Heuß. During the early
1950s, fears of carcinogenic ‘‘Noxen’’ and a general condi-
tion of toxicity (toxische Gesamtsituation) fostered the
establishment of numerous expert committees. Under
the leadership of Adolf Butenandt and pharmacologist
Hermann Druckrey, the German Research Foundation’s
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) commission on
food colorants (Farbstoffkommission) popularized Druck-
rey’s so-called summation concept according to which even
small doses of certain substances could cause cancer. The
West German risk episteme was also successful interna-
tionally. West German experts soon regained leading roles
within international bodies on cancer and food and Druck-
rey and his allies pressed for the establishment of an
international list of ‘‘unobjectionable’’ food additives. In
1957, a European conference in Ascona—site of the famous
vegetarian and nudist Monte Verita` colony of artists,
intellectuals, anarchists, and Lebensreform activists—de-
veloped an influential ‘‘positive list’’ of twenty-two unob-
jectionable food dyes.30
Druckrey’s demands for a statutory list of approved
substances found widespread public approval in West
Germany and reinforced the popular risk vernacular sur-
rounding Chemie. In 1956, the German Society for Nutri-
tion called for a reduction of non-essential chemical food
additives.31 The same year also saw a reprint of Curt
Lenzner’s 1931 influential Gift in der Nahrung (Poison28 Stoff, ‘Zur Kritik Der Chemisierung Und Technisierung Der Umwelt. Risiko-Und
Pra¨ventionspolitik Von Lebensmittelzusatzstoffen in Den 1950er Jahren’, pp. 233–39,
Stoff, ‘Vital Regulators of Efficiency: The German Concept of Wirkstoffe, 1900–1950’,
Robert N. Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2000), pp. 17–19; 71; 122–41, Gunter Vogt, ‘The Origins of Organic
Farming’, in W. Lockeretz (ed.), Organic Farming. An International History (Wall-
ingford and Cambridge (M.A.): CABI, 2011).Gunter Vogt, ‘The Origins of Organic
Farming’, in W. Lockeretz (ed.), Organic Farming. An International History (Wall-
ingford and Cambridge (M.A.): CABI, 2011).
29 Ulrike Thoms, ‘Vegetarianism, Meat, and Life Reform in Early Twentieth-Cen-
tury Germany and Their Fate in the ‘Third Reich’’, in David Cantor and Christian
Bonah (eds.), Meat, Medicine and Health in the Twentieth Century (Studies for the
Society for the Social History of Medicine; London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010), p. 157,
Frank Ueko¨tter, The Green and the Brown: A History of Conservation in Nazi Germany
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
30 Stoff, ‘Zur Kritik Der Chemisierung Und Technisierung Der Umwelt. Risiko-Und
Pra¨ventionspolitik Von Lebensmittelzusatzstoffen in Den 1950er Jahren’, Alexander
Von Schwerin, ‘Vom Gift Im Essen Zu Chronischen Umweltgefahren. Lebensmittel-
zusatzstoffe Und Die Risikopolitische Institutionalisierung Der Toxikogenetik in Der
Bundesrepublik, 1955–1964’, ibid, pp. 254–56; 61–66, Stoff, ‘Oestrogens and Butter
Yellow: Gendered Policies of Contamination in Germany 1930–1970’, pp. 30–32.
Martin Wiebel, ‘Meine Lebensmittel fu¨ r Europa’, FAZ, 07.08.1958, p. 2.
31 HSTA MELF-1149, III/5424 BMELF an die Mitglieder des Verbraucher-
ausschusses fu¨ r Erna¨hrungsfragen, Anlage—Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨ r Erna¨hrung.
Leitsa¨tze fu¨ r eine vollwertige Erna¨hrung Februar 1956 (05.07.1956), p. 5.
www.sciencedirect.comin Food), which advocated a return to wholesome ‘‘pure’’
food.32 In 1957, the West German consumer council for
nutritional questions bemoaned the ‘‘nonchalance with
which the advances of the chemical industry are often seen
abroad.’’33
Resurgent Chemieangst also provoked attacks on anti-
biotic use in food production. The most active early group of
West German critics was the Gesellschaft fu¨ r Vitalstof-
flehre (society for vital substance teaching), which promot-
ed scientific wholefood nutrition as a way to strengthen the
body’s natural defenses against to the hazardous synthetic
artifice of modern civilization. Founded by the chemist
Hans-Adalbert Schweigart, the Gesellschaft attracted
many former Nazis but could later also point to Albert
Schweitzer and Linus Pauling as prominent supporters. In
1955, it called for more research on agricultural antibiotics.
Members of the Gesellschaft were concerned about bacte-
rial resistance but mostly worried that antibiotics would
disrupt the intestinal flora’s vital powers.34 Werner Kol-
lath was amongst the most prominent antibiotic critics. An
inventor of the wholefood diet and former Nazi, Kollath’s
1942 book Die Ordnung unserer Nahrung warned against
the degradation of living food through processing. Postwar,
Kollath was thus naturally critical of antibiotics’ growing
use in food production. In 1959, he wrote a letter to the FAZ
accusing the Munich veterinarian and animal nutritionist
Johannes Bru¨ ggeman of trivializing AGPs’ hazards. Kol-
lath warned that antibiotics selected for temporary resis-
tance, destroyed the natural intestinal flora, and reduced
meat’s nutritional quality.35 However, Kollath’s Vitalstoff-
focused warnings proved ineffective.
Instead of addressing concerns about resistance or vital
substances, the passing of the 1958 West German food law
(Lebensmittelgesetz) once again revealed the power of anti-
biotics’ cultural association with Chemie and both reflected
and reinforced the vernacular risk focus on Chemie. De-
spite many similarities to contemporary US legislation,36
one of the German food law’s notable bans concerned
antibiotic preservatives. Ahead of the 1958 reform, Prof.
S. Walter Souci, head of the West German Research Insti-
tute for Food Chemistry, gave a long interview to the
Spiegel in which he referred to a widespread German
Chemikalienfurcht [Chemie-fear]. Significantly, Souci did32 Curt Lenzner, Gift in Der Nahrung. Eine Warnung, Zugleich Ein Aufruf Zur
Ru¨ ckkehr Zu Unverfa¨lschter Nahrung (2nd [1931] edn.; Leipzig: Mehnert & Pleyner
1933), Thoms, ‘Between Promise and Threat. Antibiotics in Foods in West Germany
1950–1980’, p. 193.
33 HSTA MELF-1150 III/7281 BMELF and Mitglieder des Verbraucherausschusses
fu¨ r Erna¨hrungsfragen, Anlage: Niederschrift u¨ ber die 18. Sitzung des Verbraucher-
ausschusses fu¨ r Erna¨hrungsfragen vom 07.11.1956 in Bonn (03.01.1957), p. 7.
34 Thoms, ‘Between Promise and Threat. Antibiotics in Foods in West Germany
1950–1980’, p. 191, Stoff, Gift in Der Nahrung. Zur Genese Der Verbraucherpolitik
Mitte Des 20. Jahrhunderts, pp. 149–75.
35 ‘Antibiotische Futterzusa¨tze’, FAZ, 21.10.1959, p. 7; on Kollath see: Jo¨rg Melzer,
Vollwerterna¨hrung, Dia¨tetik, Naturheilkunde, Nationalsozialismus, Sozialer
Anspruch (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003), pp. 214–19; 49; 71, Stoff, ‘Vital
Regulators of Efficiency: The German Concept of Wirkstoffe, 1900–1950’, pp. 101–04,
Stoff, ‘Zur Kritik Der Chemisierung Und Technisierung Der Umwelt. Risiko-Und
Pra¨ventionspolitik Von Lebensmittelzusatzstoffen in Den 1950er Jahren’, pp. 247–48,
Gunther Viereck, ‘"Laßt Das Natu¨ rliche So Natu¨ rlich Wie Mo¨glich" – Der Hygieniker
Und Erna¨hrungswissenschaftler Werner Kollath (1892–1970)’, in Gisela Boeck and
Hans-Uwe Lammel (eds.), Die Universita¨t Rostock in Den Jahren 1933–1945 (Rostock:
Universita¨t Rostock, 2012).
36 Stoff, ‘Oestrogens and Butter Yellow: Gendered Policies of Contamination in
Germany 1930–1970’, pp. 32–34, Langston, Toxic Bodies. Hormone Disruptors and
the Legacy of Des, pp. 77–82.
118 Endeavour Vol. 40 No. 2not disagree with Germans’ Chemikalienfurcht. The new
food law would permit substances only after manufacturers
had shown them to be safe. Adopting tropes of contemporary
Kulturkritik, Souci rejected the Anglo-American focus on
consumer choice and recommended ‘‘re-educat[ing]’’ consu-
mers to appreciate ‘‘natural’’37 food and its colors.
Amongst the substances Souci specifically opposed were
antibiotic food preservatives. Already licensed in the US
and Canada and under consideration in the UK, tetracy-
cline ice and dips were used to preserve fish, shellfish, and
poultry. However, Souci noted that German regulators had
‘‘fundamental concerns’’ about adding such ‘‘extraneous
substances’’ to ‘‘essential foodstuffs [Grundlebensmit-
tel].’’38 Ahead of his Spiegel interview, Souci had been part
of a West German delegation to the US. Following its
return, the delegation warned: ‘‘It is absolutely necessary
to maintain the ban of antibiotics and hormones and more
clearly differentiate the [law on animal feeds from the food
law].’’39 When discussing liberal US chemical use, a dele-
gation member pointed out that, in contrast to Germany,
US lawmakers ‘‘work[ed] on the premise of the correctness
of all studies conducted by industry.’’40 Although the Ger-
man delegation was aware of US consumer concerns, it
noted that these ‘‘did not have the same importance in the
opinion of the wider public as in Germany.’’41
Passed in December 1958, section 4b of the West Ger-
man food law banned the use of antibiotic preservatives.
Officials justified their decision by referring to antibiotics’
selection for resistant pathogens on food and residues’
allergenic effects. Other substances banned by section 4b
were potentially carcinogenic preservatives, pesticide resi-
dues, and hormones with thyreostatic effects.42 The Ger-
man association of housewives (Berufsorganisation der
Hausfrauen) greeted the new law: ‘‘For the housewife,
foreign substances are everything that is not contained
in food from the start, i.e. also vitamin and provitamin
additives, chemical smell and taste additives,.. and of
course hormones and antibiotics. . ..’’43
Despite referring to the selection for bacterial resistance
to justify banning antibiotic preservation, officials did not
express concern about similar resistance selection on
farms. Instead, the issue of bacterial resistance remained
linked and limited to antibiotics’ immediate presence in
dips, ice, the gut, or food. When asked about AGPs in 1958,
Souci deemed the emergence of harmful resistant bacteria
‘‘rather unlikely’’ and was far more concerned about
‘‘a potentially toxic effect’’44 of antibiotic residues and37 ‘Gift in der Nahrung’, Spiegel (45/1958), p. 37; on Kulturkritik and its use by
contemporary experts see: Stoff, Gift in Der Nahrung. Zur Genese Der Verbraucher-
politik Mitte Des 20. Jahrhunderts, p. 12.
38 ‘Gift in der Nahrung’, Spiegel (45/1958), p. 45.
39 HSTA MELF-1150, III-751 BMELF an die Mitglieder des Verbraucher-
ausschusses fu¨ r Erna¨hrungsfragen und die sta¨ndigen Ga¨ste—Niederschrift der
21. Sitzung des Verbraucherausschusses fu¨ r Erna¨hrungsfragen am 20.01.1958
(31.03.1958), p. 10.
40 Ibid, p. 13.
41 Ibid, p. 14.
42 ‘Gift In Der Nahrung’, Spiegel (45/1958), p. 45; ‘Eßwaren ohne Tarnung’, FAZ,
29.08.1959, p. BuZ6.
43 HSTA MELF-1150, 5000/86-2507 Berufsorganisation der Hausfrauen e.v. an
Staatsminister Hundhammer (02.06.1958), p. 3.
44 ‘Gift In Der Nahrung’, Spiegel (45/1958), p. 46; S. Walter Souci, ‘Zur Problematik
Der Lebensmittelkonservierung Unter Aspekten Internationaler Zusammenarbeit’,
Angewandte Chemie, 71/5 (1959), pp. 184–85.
www.sciencedirect.commetabolites in foodstuffs. This emphasis on antibiotics’
unknown metabolites and view of bacterial resistance
reflected the contemporary state of knowledge. Aware of
antibiotic resistance since the early 1940s, researchers
thought that bacterial resistance proliferated only verti-
cally in a hereditary fashion. Bacteria were either natural-
ly resistant or developed resistance through random
mutations. Whereas antibiotics selected for resistant bac-
teria, discontinuing antibiotic use would end this evolu-
tionary advantage and lead to resistant bacteria’s
competitive inhibition by sensitive bacteria. The vertical
or ‘‘genetic’’ interpretation of bacterial resistance was fur-
ther strengthened by the contemporary Lysenko affair’s
discrediting of ‘‘adaptationist’’ explanations of resistance.
In contrast to later environmental concepts of ‘‘horizontal’’
resistance proliferation, thinking of resistance prolifera-
tion as the spread of individual bacterial strains made it
easy to conceive of resistance as a phenomenon that was
limited to certain locales. Because resistant strains would
be subject to competitive inhibition once outside of antibi-
otic environments, 1950s experts could easily express con-
cern about spreading resistance in hospitals whilst
remaining unconcerned about similar resistance selection
on farms. Meanwhile, the rapid development of new anti-
biotics made observers confident about humans’ ability to
stay ahead of bacterial resistance.45
The combination of regulators’ and experts’ residue-
focused risk episteme, the public’s Chemie-oriented risk
vernacular, and the theory of vertical resistance prolifera-
tion helps to explain why AGPs were licensed with such
ease throughout the 1950s. As described by Ulrike Thoms,
the majority of West German experts remained enthusias-
tic about antibiotics’ ability to boost national and global
food production and help farmers survive growing compe-
tition.46 Attending influential symposia in the US, German
researchers estimated that AGPs produced a surplus of
17.50–27.50 Marks per 100 kg of meat.47 Further aiding
AGPs’ rapid licensing was the confused state of West
German drug and feed legislation. Until 1961, West
Germany had no unified drug law and the new law was
quickly made obsolete by the contemporaneous thalido-
mide scandal. It was only in 1976 that a new drug law
created a mandatory licensing system based on efficacy
and safety controls.48 Still based on rules from 1926,
similar confusion characterized German feed regulations.
After the 1951 Futtermittelnormordnung (feedstuff norm
regulation) licensed antibiotics in feeds as ‘‘substances45 Scott H. Podolsky et al., ‘History Teaches Us That Confronting Antibiotic Resis-
tance Requires Stronger Global Collective Action’, Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics,
43/2 (Special Supplement) (2015); on the adaptationist controversy see Angela N. H.
Creager, ‘Adaptation or Selection? Old Issues and New Stakes in the Postwar Debates
over Bacterial Drug Resistance’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biology and
Biomedical Sciences, 38 (2007), p. 159.
46 Thoms, ‘Between Promise and Threat. Antibiotics in Foods in West Germany
1950–1980’, pp. 184–85; 90.
47 Ibid, p. 189. West German attendees of the 1955 International Conference on
Antibiotics in Agriculture were Munich University’s Johannes Bru¨ ggemann and Enno
Freerksen, director of the tuberculosis research institute Borstel (Bad Oldesloe),
‘Proceedings First International Conference on the Use of Antibiotics in Agriculture’,
First International Conference On Antibiotics In Agriculture (National Academy of
Sciences – National Research Council, 1955), pp. 9–10.
48 ‘Fassung des Arzneimittelgesetzes vom 24.08.1976’, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL] I
Nr. 109, 31.08.1976, pp. 2445, 2448, 2483; for a more extensive study of German
pharmaceutical law see Arthur Daemmrich, Pharmacopolitics. Drug Regulation in the
United States and Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).
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permit petitions to a Ministry of Agriculture expert com-
mittee. However, permit evaluations cannot have been too
demanding since the number of special permits, permit
modifications, and other rulings had grown to 17,121 by
1967.49
Meanwhile, officials had virtually no oversight of anti-
biotics’ use on farms or presence in foodstuffs. In 1968,
Prof. Dieter Großklaus of the Federal Health Office [Bun-
desgesundheitsamt] warned about ‘‘absolutely insufficient’’
assay methods and called for an ‘‘encompassing residue
control for German animal products.’’50 However, Großk-
laus’ warnings went unheeded. Instead, officials and media
commentators boasted about the superiority of West Ger-
man food safety and complained about lax foreign stan-
dards.51 This would not stay so for long.
In Britain, unique research facilities were gradually
shifting concerns away from residues to the issue of bacte-
rial resistance proliferation. Starting in the mid-1950s,
British scientists published alarming data on the spread
of resistant bacteria on farms and in hospitals.52 By the
mid-1960s, concerns were heightened by findings that
resistance not only proliferated vertically but could also
be communicated horizontally between different bacterial
species via the exchange of extrachromosomal DNA frag-
ments called plasmids. Plasmid-borne resistance (R-fac-
tors) spread in an ‘‘infectious’’ manner and turned bacterial
resistance from a local into an environmental hazard.53
Alarmed, the British government convened two so-called
Netherthorpe committees on agricultural antibiotics,
which called for a change of licensing in favor of nonthera-
peutic (therapeutically irrelevant) antibiotics in 1962 and
a review of veterinary prescription practices in 1966.54
German reactions to the Netherthorpe reports were
mixed and mostly linked the dangers of resistance to the
immediate presence of antibiotic residues. During the
early 1960s, influential researchers like Hans Knothe from
the University of Kiel claimed that there was no evidence
of harm resulting from AGP-use. Knothe’s position was
endorsed by the German Congress of Physicians (A¨rztetag)
in 1959 and by the Federal Health Council (Bundesgesund-
heitsrat) in July 1961. In 1963, Knothe claimed that in the
case of tetracycline, resistance development in humans
became relevant only when exposure exceeded 25 mg per
day. A decade of experience had shown that allergies would
not emerge because AGPs were too low-dosed and residues
were destroyed by cooking.55 Media reports on antibiotic49 Petersen, ‘Entwicklungen Im Deutschen Futtermittelrecht’, pp. 3–4.
50 ‘Alarm im Schweinestall’, Zeit (13/1968), p. 41.
51 Ibid, pp. 40–41.
52 H. Williams Smith and W. E. Crabb, ‘The Effect of the Continuous Administration
of Diets Containing Low Levels of Tetracyclines on the Incidence of Drug-Resistant
Bacterium Coli in the Faeces of Pigs and Chickens: The Sensitivity of the Bact. Coli to
Other Chemotherapeutic Agents’, The Veterinary Record, 69 (1959).
53 E. S. Anderson, ‘Origin of Transferable Drug-Resistance Factors in the Enter-
obacteriaceae’, British Medical Journal, 2/5473 (1965), E. S. Anderson and Naomi
Datta, ‘Resistance to Pencillins and Its Transfer in Enterobacteriaceae’, The Lancet,
285/7382 (1965), E. S. Anderson and M. J. Lewis, ‘Drug Resistance and Its Transfer in
Salmonella Typhimurium’, Nature, 206/4984 (1965).
54 Bud, Penicillin: Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 174–80, Claas Kirchhelle, Pyrrhic
Progress. Antibiotics and Western Food Production (1949–2013) (Oxford [Disserta-
tion], 2015).
55 Hans Knothe, ‘Langfristige Nutritive Anwendung in Der Tiererna¨hrung Im
Hinblick Auf Die Menschliche Gesundheit’, Mu¨ nchener Medizinische Wochenschrift,
105/4 (1963), pp. 175–81.
www.sciencedirect.comresistance also remained marginal. Whereas one FAZ
article warned against resistance development,56 another
portrayed antibiotics as natural substances also ‘‘con-
tained in natural feed- and vegetable plants, for example
nasturtium.’’57 The latter article criticized Germans’ ad-
herence to the false binary of ‘‘’natural’ and ‘good’’’ vs.
‘‘’unnatural’ and ‘bad’.’’58 In 1964, Ruth Harrison’s Animal
Machines [translation 1965]59 triggered West German
protest against animal welfare problems and antibiotic
overuse on ‘‘factory farms.’’ However, once again, the main
issue was not the selection for bacterial resistance but
antibiotics’ effect on food quality and safety. In 1966, a
Spiegel article’s almost literal translation of Animal
Machines described agricultural antibiotics as a ticking
‘‘biological bomb’’60 but continued to limit the hazards of
resistance proliferation to antibiotic residues’ immediate
presence. The Chemie-focus proved hard to break.
It was only in 1967—over one year after reports in the
Anglo-American press—that the Spiegel warned its read-
ers about plasmid-borne R-factors as ‘‘tentacles of hor-
ror.’’61 Citing the New England Journal of Medicine, the
Spiegel accused the ‘‘tons (Tonnen-Quantita¨ten)’’62 of agri-
cultural antibiotics of facilitating a return to pre-antibiotic
times. In 1968, the Zeit followed suit and warned about
resistant epidemics resulting from overuse of agricultural
antibiotics. Describing plasmids as a kind of ‘‘bacterial
esparanto,’’63 the newspaper enumerated policy measures
to counteract resistance such as mandatory antibiotic
withdrawal periods prior to slaughter and a reservation
of therapeutically relevant antibiotics for humans. Howev-
er, despite its belated acknowledgment of ‘‘dangerous’’ R-
factors, the West German press continued to frame antibi-
otic hazards mainly as invisible residues.64 ‘‘Infectious
resistance’’ emanating from farms thus failed to change
the traditional risk vernacular’s focus on chemical resi-
dues. The staging of the new risk had been unsuccessful.
West German farmers shared the national media’s cul-
turally ingrained focus on Chemie-residues. Although most
farmers reacted hostile to consumer criticism, farming
magazines featured many articles warning about exposure
to Chemie in food and the environment. On fields and in
sties, Chemie was considered beneficial, in human bodies
Chemie was equated with Gift.65 This rule also held true for
agricultural antibiotics. Lacking national residue controls,
dairies and magazines informed farmers how to avoid
antibiotic residues in milk when treating cows for mastitis56 ‘Die Antibiotika-Mast und die Gesundheit’, FAZ, 02.07.1963, p. 9.
57 Hans-Joachim Metzlaff, ‘Werden die Tiere zu rasch schlachtreif gemacht’, FAZ,
23.02.1963, p. 7.
58 Ibid.
59 Ruth Harrison, Tiermaschinen. Die Neuen Landwirtschaftlichen Fabrikbetriebe
(Mu¨ nchen: Biederstein, 1965).
60 ‘Angst vor der biologischen Bombe’, Spiegel (21/1966), p. 65; also see: HSTA Minn
87782 Anlage zu III – 5594/2-11/65 Deutscher Bundestag, Niederschrift der Sitzung
anla¨ßlich der Fragestunde, Bonn, 29.11.1965, pp. 81–82.
61 ‘Bakterien. Fu¨ hler des Schreckens’, Spiegel (31/1967), p. 101.
62 Ibid.
63 ‘Alarm im Schweinestall’, Zeit (13/1968), pp. 40–41.
64 ‘So vergiften wir unsere Umwelt’, Zeit (28/1969), p. 45; also see the reformed Hans
Knothe, ‘Die Epidemiologie Der Salmonellosen’, Zentralblatt fu¨ r Bakteriologie, Para-
sitenkunde, Infektionskrankheiten und Hygiene – Erste Abteilung, 205/1-3 (1967).
65 ‘Beim Pflanzenschutz sich selbst schu¨ tzen’, BLW (12/1965), p. 68; ‘Chemischer
Pflanzenschutz’ und Wild’, LWWL (20/1966), pp. 7–9; ‘Das ist auch im Hausgarten
wichtig: Vorsicht mit Pflanzenschutzmitteln’, BLW (19/1965), p. 38.
Fig. 1. Cover of Der Spiegel 26 (1971) ‘‘Gift auf dem Tisch.’’ http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/.
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72 HSTA MInn 91348/I IA-1 25-1/338 Bundesrat an den Bundeskanzler und den
Herren Pra¨sidenten des Bundesrates (26.06.1967); in November 1963 a harmonisa-
tion of antibiotic rules had explicitly been rejected by Council Directive (64/54/EEC);
on the enactment of the Kewitz recommendations see Lo¨bsack, ‘Veruntreute Arznei-
Endeavour Vol. 40 No. 2 121(a wide group of bacterial udder infections). By contrast,
warnings about bacterial resistance rarely featured.66
However, major changes were afoot. In 1969, Britain
announced pioneering resistance-motivated AGP bans.
Compelled by scientific and public pressure, the British
government had convened the so-called Swann Committee
in 1968. One year later, the Swann Committee’s report
called for a ban of penicillin and tetracycline AGPs. Only
antibiotics considered medically irrelevant were to be in-
cluded in AGPs. Although resulting reforms failed to re-
duce either antibiotic use or bacterial resistance, the
British Swann report heralded a major shift of antibiotic
regulation and put significant pressure on other European
governments to reform their antibiotic regulations.67
In Germany, reform calls were endorsed by the DFG and
led to the formation of a new expert and regulatory risk
episteme focusing on the hazards of bacterial resistance. In
1967, the DFG Commission on Active Ingredients in Ani-
mal Nutrition (Kommission fu¨ r Wirkstoffe in der Tierer-
na¨hrung) under veterinary pharmacologist Helmut Kewitz
had begun to canvass experts’ opinions on AGPs.68 Pub-
lished only slightly after Swann, a 1969 report by the
Kewitz Commission warned that none of Germany’s AGPs
fulfilled pre-defined DFG criteria. Feed antibiotics should:
1) be resorbed only in small quantities in the gastro-
intestinal tract;
2) not effect changes in animals’ bodies, which would
complicate residue detection;
3) not possess antigenic or haptic properties [Haptei-
genschaft], so that allergies would not occur;
4) not be used as therapeutics for humans and animals
and not select for cross- and multiresistance to
therapeutic antibiotics.69
Criticizing penicillin’s allergenic properties, the Com-
mission reported that DFG-commissioned microbiological
evaluations had confirmed the danger of ‘‘infectious’’
(multi)-resistance emanating from AGP-fed animals. It
was necessary to ‘‘assume that [AGPs] would reduce the
therapeutic efficacy of antibiotics’’70 for human and animal
diseases—especially those associated with
enterobacteriacae. The Kewitz Commission recommended
‘‘no longer delaying unavoidable decisions.’’71 West
Germany should restrict nonmedical antibiotic use and
only license nontherapeutic AGPs that did not select for
multiple resistance amongst intestinal bacteria. With the
exception of penicillin feeds, which were to be banned
immediately, the Commission recommended a transitional
period of three to four years for the introduction of AGP-
restrictions. It was hoped that this would foster the devel-
opment of nontherapeutic AGPs. Other recommendations
included reducing antibiotic use during animals’ finishing66 ‘Nach der Penicillin-Behandlung: Fu¨ nf Tage lang keine Milch liefern’, LWWL (43/
1965), p. 16; Teschner, ‘Rentable Hu¨ hnerhaltung nur bei gesunder Herde’, LWWL (32/
1963), p. 2232.
67 Kirchhelle, Pyrrhic Progress. Antibiotics and Western Food Production (1949–
2013).
68 ‘Alarm im Schweinestall’, Zeit (13/1968), p. 42.
69 Helmut Kewitz, ‘Antibiotika in Der Tiererna¨hrung’, Zentralblatt fu¨ r Veterina¨r-
medizin, 17 (1970 (Series B)), p. 116; the exact relation between the Kewitz and Swann
Committees is the subject of ongoing research on the part of the author.
70 Kewitz, ‘Antibiotika in der Tiererna¨hrung’, pp. 117–18.
71 Ibid, p. 118.
www.sciencedirect.comperiod, mandating DFG-approved antibiotic dosages, and
avoiding further expansions of antibiotic use.
The age of the Chemie-Bauer (1970–1989)
Although it endorsed the Kewitz report and banned peni-
cillin AGPs as early as 1969, the West German government
could not enact further restrictions on its own. As a mem-
ber of the European Economic Community’s (EEC) Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP), West Germany had agreed
to harmonize its veterinary drug, feed, and food laws with
the rest of the community.72 Launched in 1967 and sup-
posed to come into effect in 1969, initial EEC harmoniza-
tion policies were supposed to unify labels, drug dosages in
feeds, and tolerance levels for residues in animal tissues.
While initial EEC harmonization had not addressed anti-
biotic resistance or restrictions, the Swann and Kewitz
reports prompted the EEC to pass Directive 70/526/EEC in
November 1970. The directive gave member states up to
six years to phase out penicillin, tetracyclines, and the
macrolide spiramycin from AGPs.73 In West Germany,
tetracycline AGPs were phased out by August 1973 and
streptomycin AGPs’ license expired in 1974. Reasserting
the trope of superior German standards, a federal official
proclaimed that West Germany was ‘‘probably the state
with the least antibiotic classes used in feeds.’’74
However, German media commentators did not think
that phasing out AGPs went far enough. Instead, the 1970s
and 1980s saw an intensification of Chemie-fears and
portrayals of farmers as irresponsible Chemie-Bauern
(chemical farmers). Regarding antibiotics, the resurgent
popular risk vernacular of Chemie residues once again
overshadowed the risk of resistance proliferation and
shaped German antibiotic regulation. In 1971, a Spiegel
cover featured a table laden with meat products bearing
poison (Gift) signs (Fig. 1). The issue was titled ‘‘Drugs in
the feed, poison on the table.’’75 Despite the coming AGP
restrictions, the Spiegel claimed: ‘‘the drug [Die Droge] is
still omnipresent in [animals’] trough.’’76 With legal and
illegal access to many dangerous substances, farmers were
endangering consumers. Farmers’ use of the toxic antibi-
otic chloramphenicol ‘‘was as dangerous as the razor in the
hand of the monkey.’’77 Referring to ‘‘black market chan-
nels’’ and invoking the specter of cancer, an ‘‘industry
expert’’ warned: ‘‘nobody controls to what extent crunchy
cutlets and roast chickens from the grill contain dangerous
residues.’’78 With slaughtered animals supposedly ‘‘full of
antibiotics to their neck,’’79 the magazine clamed that a
recent study had found antibiotic residues in over 67.3% ofmittel’, Zeit (13/1971).
73 HSTA MInn 91348/II 24-7/131Bundesrat-Gesundheitsausschuß No. 9 7126; Nie-
derschrift u¨ ber 26. Sitzung am 28.08.1967; Punkt 3 EWG Vorlage 338/67; Directive 70/
524/EEC (23.11.1970).
74 Kewitz, ‘Antibiotika in Der Tiererna¨hrung’, p. 119.; J. I. R. Castanon, ‘History of
the Use of Antibiotic as Growth Promoters in European Poultry Feeds’, Poultry
Science, 86/11 (2007), pp. 2446–69.
75 ‘Drogen im Futter, Gift auf dem Tisch’, Spiegel (26/1971).
76 ‘Auf Wachstum getrimmt’, Spiegel (26/1971), p. 54.
77 ‘Wenn sie nicht fressen, spritze ich sie selbst’, Spiegel (26/1971), p. 52.
78 Ibid, p. 46.
79 Ibid.
88 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA 2 Hemmstoffe – O¨strogene, Thyreostatika in
Lebensmitteln, Verfu¨ gung A; 10.1, III 6 – 5683/146 Bayerische Landesanstalt fu¨ r
122 Endeavour Vol. 40 No. 21508 veal carcasses. Despite noting that up to 10% of
human coli-bacteria were already resistant to more than
five antibiotics, the Spiegel’s main concern was clearly that
Germans were ‘‘unprotected from residues of penicillin in
their breakfast milk, from carcinogenic arsenicals in their
crunchy cutlet.’’80 In the Zeit, Theo Lo¨bsack reported that
illegal veterinary drug sales now accounted for 40–50
million Marks or 30–40% of the total market.81 The FAZ
printed similar reports.82
The intensification of German concerns about antibi-
otic residues was no coincidence. In 1972, newspapers
had reported a major residue scandal in Bavaria. Be-
tween 1970 and 1972, the city of Munich had analyzed
19,000 animal carcasses for antibiotic residues. Accord-
ing to the Director of Communal Services, Werner Vei-
gel, the results were ‘‘simply scandalous’’: signs of
veterinary drug abuse and residues had been detected
in 12% of cattle, 22% of calves, 7% of pigs, and 3% of
sheep.83 Downplaying Veigel’s findings and putting pres-
sure on the defiant official, the Bavarian government
wrongly claimed that tests had included so-called casu-
alty slaughters and that ordinary Bavarian meat was
unobjectionable.84
Prompted by Veigel’s warnings, an EEC information
request disclosed that Bavarian histological analyses
had shown that 27% of male and 56% of female calf
carcasses indicated exposure to illegal carcinogenic
estrogens.85 Meanwhile, the Bavarian Veterinary State
Research Institute found antibiotic contamination in
23.9% of fresh meat, 32.6% of meat products, and 3.2%
of milk samples.86 Internally, West German officials
acknowledged that there was ‘‘no doubt that animals
and fresh meat contained a certain extent of antimicro-
bial substances.’’87 However, the supposedly strict West
German meat inspection (Fleischbeschaubesetz) and food
laws (Lebensmittelgesetz) contained no clause allowing
officials to penalize offenders. Section 4b Nr. 1 of the
1958 food law prohibited antibiotics’ deliberate addition
to food but did not address their ‘‘accidental’’ presence in
meat. In contrast to the milk law (Milchgesetz), which
mandated a five-day antibiotic withdrawal period and80 Ibid., pp. 49 & 62.
81 Theo Lo¨bsack, ‘Veruntreute Arzneimittel’, Zeit (13/1971).
82 ‘Die Migros Polizei’, FAZ, 02.11.1971, p. 13; ‘Was ein Filetstu¨ ck heutzutage alles
enthalten kann’, FAZ, 15.03.1972, p. 10; ‘Gefa¨hrliche Medikamente im Kochtopf?’,
FAZ, 11.01.1971, p. 7.
83 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA2 Antibiotika und O¨strogene, Verfu¨ gung A;
Karton Nr. 10.2/10.3, Aktenband I Arzneimittel und O¨strogene; Beiakt zu Akten-
Nummer 5580, Abdruck aus der Su¨ ddeutschen Zeitung Nr. 43, 22.02.1972, p. 9;
Abdruck aus Mu¨ nchener Merkur – Mu¨ nchener Stadtzeitung Nr. 43, 22.02.1972, p. 11.
84 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA2 Antibiotika und O¨strogene, Verfu¨ gung A;
Karton Nr. 10.2/10.3, Aktenband I Arzneimittel und O¨strogene; Beiakt zu Akten-
Nummer 5580, II 13-5325 h-M-1/72 Landeshauptstadt Mu¨ nchen, Kommunalreferent
an die Regierung von Oberbayern (29.02.1972); Entwurf III 6- 5580/13 an das Bayer-
ische Staatsministerium fu¨ r ELF (24.03.1972); IE6-5580/20 Regierung von Oberfran-
ken an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern (07.06.1973).
85 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA2 Antibiotika und O¨strogene, Verfu¨ gung A;
Karton Nr. 10.2/10.3, Aktenband I Arzneimittel und O¨strogene; Beiakt zu Akten-
Nummer 5580, Anlage 4: III 6-5580/16, Entwurf an den BMJFG (25.04.1972), p. 2.
86 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA 2 Hemmstoffe – O¨strogene, Thyreostatika in
Lebensmitteln, Verfu¨ gung A; 10.1, III6 – 5580/4-1 Bayerische Staatliche Veterina¨r-
untersuchungsanstalt Nu¨ rnberg an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern
(08.03.1972).
87 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA2 Antibiotika und O¨strogene, Verfu¨ gung A;
Karton Nr. 10.2/10.3, Aktenband I Arzneimittel und O¨strogene; Beiakt zu Akten-
Nummer 5580, IE5-4480/E1 7.77i Der Minister fu¨ r ELF des Landes Nordrhein-
Westfalen an den BMJFG (28.06.1972), p. 1.
www.sciencedirect.comoutlawed residues in milk, officials had to prove to courts
that individual residue amounts found in meat would
endanger consumers’ health.88
With food security compromised and residues also
found in meat imports, Bonn was once again forced to
act. In 1972, social democratic Minister of Health Ka¨te
Strobel, who had been one of the key forces behind the
1958 food law, promised to upgrade meat controls, reduce
antibiotic concentrations in feeds, and introduce manda-
tory drug withdrawal times.89 Reflecting the public’s on-
going risk prioritization of residues, officials, however, did
not choose to monitor for bacterial resistance. They also
considered further antibiotic restrictions ‘‘unacceptable’’
because they expected ‘‘the strongest resistance [from
farmers].’’90 Concerned about agricultural protest, a
memo advised the Bavarian government ‘‘to avoid every-
thing that could distract the public from the sole respon-
sibility of the federal government for the solution of the
problem.’’91
Following bitter internal clashes over antibiotics’ re-
spective hazards, the West German government launched
a national residue-sampling program using bacterial in-
hibition tests in April 1974.92 Inhibition tests are quick
and easy to use and follow a simple principle: kidney and
muscle tissue samples are placed in a petri dish containing
culture medium and a test organism (usually Bacillus
subtilis). If, following a pre-defined incubation period,
bacterial growth around meat samples is inhibited this
can indicate antimicrobial residues, which can then be
tested for with more precise but slower methods.93 In West
Germany’s public abattoirs, inhibition tests were to be
used on every 100th animal carcass and every casualty
slaughter. Between April and December 1974, veterinary
officials conducted a staggering 165,000 inhibition tests
resulting in 1.5% positives for muscle meat and 10%
positives for offal samples. The 132-fold of contemporaryTierseuchenbeka¨mpfung an das Bayerische Staatsministerium des Innern
(02.11.1971), p. 2; Memorandum Abteilung IE – Antibiotika im Fleisch [undated],
pp. 4–5.
89 ‘Fleischbeschaulich’, Spiegel (33/1972), p. 58; HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA2
Antibiotika und O¨strogene, Verfu¨ gung A; Karton Nr. 10.2/10.3, Aktenband I Arznei-
mittel und O¨strogene; Beiakt zu Akten-Nummer 5580, IE6 Bu11.9 Information des
BJFG (31.08.1972), p. 2; on Ka¨te Strobel and residue detections in foreign meat see:
Stoff, Gift in Der Nahrung. Zur Genese Der Verbraucherpolitik Mitte Des 20. Jahrhun-
derts, pp. 75–76 & 78. HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA 2 Hemmstoffe – O¨strogene,
Thyreostatika in Lebensmitteln, Verfu¨ gung A; 10.1, III 6 – 5683/63 Entwurf an die
Regierungen (24.05.1971); III 6 – 5683/132 Entwurf an den BMJFG (30.09.1971).
90 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA 2 Hemmstoffe – O¨strogene, Thyreostatika in
Lebensmitteln, Verfu¨ gung A; 10.1, Memorandum Abteilung IE – Antibiotika im
Fleisch [undated], pp. 1 & 9.
91 Ibid, p. 10.
92 ‘Verordnung zur A¨nderung der Ausfu¨ hrungsbestimmungen A u¨ ber die Untersu-
chung und gesundheitspolizeiliche Behandlung der Schlachttiere und des Fleisches
bei Schlachtungen im Inland vom 18.12.1973’, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBL) I Nr. 1/74, p.
18; on clashes between researchers and industry and government experts see: HSTA
MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA 2 Hemmstoffe – O¨strogene, Thyreostatika in Lebensmitteln,
Verfu¨ gung A; 10.1, Gottfried Wolff an Hans Eisenmann (26.09.1972); Landwirtschaf-
tliche Untersuchungs- und Forschungsanstalt Kiel an Schiedermaier (28.06.1972);
Institut fu¨ r Erna¨hrungsphysiologie in der Tiera¨rztlichen Fakulta¨t (LMU) an Schie-
dermaier (28.06.1972); Gottfried Wolff an G. Beck (27.09.1972).
93 ‘Biologischer Hemmstofftest’, Bayerisches Landesamt fu¨ r Gesundheit und Lebens-
mittelsicherheit, URL: http://www.lgl.bayern.de/lebensmittel/hygiene/fleischhygiene/
hemmstofftest/ (accessed: 05.05.2015).
Endeavour Vol. 40 No. 2 123federal testing in the US, the massive scale of testing was
supposed to restore trust in West German meat.94
In the agricultural community, inhibition tests
remained controversial. For one thing, regulators initially
had difficulties assessing how big inhibition zones had to be
to indicate drug residues as opposed to naturally occurring
antimicrobial substances. Comparing the inhibition test to
a ‘‘lottery game,’’95 this imprecision caused alarm amongst
farmers fearing false positives. Moreover, early B. subtilis-













Polymixin 300 ppm96The public health implications were significant. Tests
were able to detect small concentrations of legally avail-
able and nontoxic tetracyclines but only very high concen-
trations of hazardous black market antibiotics like
chloramphenicol, neomycin, and polymixin. Noting that
the odds of being caught remained small, one farming
magazine claimed: ‘‘Shrewd or irresponsible people will
continue to be able to get away with using the ‘right’
substances.’’97 In other words, inhibition tests might actu-
ally boost black market sales.
Under public pressure to combat illegal Chemie in food,
the West German government pressed for EEC-wide inhi-
bition test controls. By the second half of the 1970s, West
German pressure led to major clashes with the British
government and German rejections of contaminated Brit-
ish meat.98 Describing a 1978 meeting on standardized
EEC meat controls, a British delegate noted that discus-
sions of sample sizes led to a ‘‘good deal of acrimonious
discussion with the German representative proving the
most vocal.’’99 Continental representatives had talked ‘‘a
good deal of nonsense . . . about the willingness of consu-
mers to pay for extra protection.’’10094 ‘Hemmstoff-Test am Ende’, BLW (26/1975), p. 9; on testing in the US see ‘Regula-
tion of Food Additives and Medicated Animal Feeds’, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations (House of Representatives Washington DC: US Govern-
ment Printing Office 1971), p. 183.
95 ‘Der Hemmstofftest ist ein Lotteriespiel’, LWWL (36/1973), p. 44.
96 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA 2 Hemmstoffe – O¨strogene, Thyreostatika in
Lebensmitteln, Verfu¨ gung A; 10.1, LUFA Kiel an Schiedermaier (28.06.1972), p. 2.
97 ‘Deutsche Nahrungsmittel werden zunehmend gesu¨ nder’, LWWL (41/1974), p. 14.
98 The British National Archives (TNA) MAF 461/67 (Steering Group on Food
Surveillance Sub-Group on Antibiotic Residues in Food, 1st Meeting, 20 April,
1976), pp. 5 and 7.
99 TNA MAF 461/68 (EEC, Summary Report of Meeting with Representatives of
Community Institutions or Of Member Governments, ‘Working Party‘ Veterinary
Legislation’ Sub-Group‘ Residues’ (25–26.05.1978), ‘Draft Directives on Undesirable
Residues in Fresh Meat’, 30 May, 1978), p. 2.
100 Ibid.
www.sciencedirect.comDomestically, German regulators also attempted to
crack down on the ‘‘Grey Drug Market’’ (Grauer
Arzneimittelmarkt). Attempting to cut costs, some farmers
were mass-medicating their herds with dubious drug cock-
tails. Meanwhile, various salesmen and veterinarians of-
fered prescriptions and medications at competitive prices
without even seeing the respective animals. By 1975, the
popular term Autobahntierarzt (motorway veterinarian) had
emerged to describe veterinarians selling drugs out of cars at
motorway stops. The Grey Drug Market itself was enabled
by a lack of nationally unified regulations for veterinary drug
sales and a 1964 Dutch law legalizing the export of thera-
peutics even if these substances were illegal in other coun-
tries.101
Attempting to redress the situation without severing
farmers’ access to prophylactic treatments, the West Ger-
man government devised a compromise solution. In April
1974, a veterinary amendment (Tierarztnovelle) mandated
that drugs should be dispensed to farmers only if herds had
actually been inspected. One year later, section 12 of the
1975 ordinance for the purchase, production, storage, and
distribution of therapeutics (Verordnung u¨ ber Erwerb,
Herstellung, Aufbewahrung und Abgabe von Arzneimit-
teln) specified that larger quantities of medication were
to be dispensed only if animals were inspected every eight
weeks and medications’ purpose and duration was docu-
mented prior to sales.102
However, the directives proved ineffective and reports
soon surfaced that veterinarians were now selling drugs
alongside ‘‘herd inspection confirmations’’ via mail order. A
spot check in a Bavarian county revealed that ‘‘in no single
case . . . use and fate of sold therapeutics’’103 had been
documented properly. Such erroneous documentation
was not only problematic for food security but also regard-
ing the state’s ability to tax veterinarians’ income from
drug sales. Amongst farmers and veterinarians, officials
encountered a wall of silence:
It is usually impossible to follow up on occasional
accusations (. . .) regarding the supposedly flourish-
ing therapeutic black market because no single
veterinarian is willing to file an official com-
plaint.104
The silence was normally broken only when one veteri-
narian attempted to expand sales amongst another veter-
inarian’s clients. However, even then, denunciations were
filed privately. According to one veterinarian, farmers were
purchasing medications directly because they ‘‘did
not want to pay the 25 Marks for a herd visit from the101 Theo Lo¨bsack, ‘Veruntreute Arzneimittel. Antibiotika im Futter’, Zeit (13/1971);
the earliest reference to Autobahntierarzt found after a cursory search is ‘Neuer
Schlag gegen Tiera¨rzte’, BLW (50/1975), p. 12.
102 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5581 Hausapotheken der Tiera¨rzte, Karton 12 (1968–
1974), Bayerischer Landtag 8. Wahlperiode Drucksache 8/338 (12.03.1975); Mu¨ n-
sterer, ‘Tiera¨rztliche Betreuung neu geregelt’, BLW (35/1975), p. 8.
103 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) Hausapotheken der Tiera¨rzte (Karton 12), 1976–1987
Band V, IE 6 – 5581/4 Regierung der Oberpfalz an das Bayerische Staatsministerium
des Innern (22.08.1977), p. 2; also see: Hausapotheken der Tiera¨rzte (Karton 12),
1976–1987 Band V, Anlage zu 5581/7 H. Kahn an das Veterina¨ramt Mayen-Koblenz
(03.03.1977).
104 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) Hausapotheken der Tiera¨rzte (Karton 12), 1976–1987
Band V, IE 6 – 5581/4 Regierung der Oberpfalz an das Bayerische Staatsministerium
des Innern (22.08.1977), p. 3.
Fig. 2. Cover of Der Spiegel 44 (1978) ‘‘Vergiften uns die Bauern?’’
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/.
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Endeavour Vol. 40 No. 2 125responsible veterinarian.’’105 By 1981, German states were
conducting 400 investigations against illegal veterinary
drug sales with most investigations centring on Lower
Saxony, Bavaria, and Hessia. Most illegal sales consisted
of beta-blockers, estrogens, sulphonamides, and antibiotics
with chloramphenicol receiving special mention.106
Compliance problems also affected the West German
feed industry. Despite increased fines and the incorpo-
ration of consumer protection into the federal feed law
in 1973, local authorities often treated feedstuff offences as
non-prosecutable minor misdemeanors. One reason for
this was lacking access to antibiotic assays and widely
differing assay methodology across West Germany.107 In
1973, spot checks revealed that 45.8% of antibiotic feed
samples failed to meet German feed law requirements.108
While federal violation detections fell to 9.1% of analyzed
samples in 1978, actual fines for feedstuff offences
remained puny.109
Preoccupied with antibiotic residues and feed viola-
tions, German authorities continued to neglect the dangers
of bacterial resistance proliferation and unilaterally li-
censed further AGPs such as avoparcin in 1977. Focusing
on avoparcin’s efficacy, toxicity, and carcinogenic effects,
regulators ignored grave internal concerns about Cyana-
mid-sponsored resistance tests, which had measured re-
sistance development amongst already resistant
bacteria.110
Meanwhile, German consumers’ on-going concern about
conventional food invigorated the previously marginal
organic sector. For many consumers, a large part of organic
food’s appeal was the absence of Chemie. Regarding animal
products, the absence of antibiotics and hormones served
as a common denominator of many alternative production
philosophies. Just how powerful the appeal of antibiotic-
free ‘‘purity’’ could be is highlighted by the Redlefsen KG’s
1972 launch of the antibiotic-free Reinschmecker (pure
taster) sausage—a word play on Feinschmecker (gourmet).105 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) Hausapotheken der Tiera¨rzte (Karton 12), 1976–1987
Band V, IE6-5581-4/84 Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern – Protokoll der
Besprechung am 28.03.1984 zum Thema ‘Tiera¨rztliche Hausapotheke in der
Gemeinschaftspraxis der Herren Dr. Schmidt, Dr. Lang und Wo¨rner (10.07.1984),
p. 3; also see: Hausapotheken der Tiera¨rzte (Karton 12), 1976–1987 Band V, Anlage zu
5581/7 Dr. H. Kahn an das Veterina¨ramt Mayen-Koblenz (03.03.1977).
106 HSTA MELF-173e 7132/1837 Anhang: Bundeskriminalamt an den Bundesmin-
ister des Innern (02.05.1981), pp. 1–2.
107 BGBL I (03.09.1968), p. 990; HSTA MELF-173b (vorla¨ufig), 7132/1524 Anlage:
Bayerische Landesanstalt fu¨ r Tierzucht an den Ministerialdirigent Minderle, Anlage
–Scha¨rferes Futtermittelrecht (03.01.1974); MELF (vorla¨ufig) -173a, 7132/1470
BMELF an die Herren Minister und Senatoren fu¨ r ELF der La¨nder – Anlage
Schreiben des BMELF an den Bundesminister fu¨ r Justiz (29.01.1974);MELF (vorla¨u-
fig) -173a, 7132/1519 Entwurf Abteilung M an das Bundes MELF (13.02.1975); MELF-
173 b (vorla¨ufig) 7132/1620 Bayerische Landesanstalt fu¨ r Bodenkultur und Pflanzen-
bau an das Bayerische Landesamt fu¨ r Erna¨hrungswirtschaft z.Hd. Herrn Jany –
Amtliche Futtermittelkontrolle – Hier Fu¨ tterungsantibiotika (15.09.1976).
108 HSTA MELF (vorla¨ufig) -173a, 7132/1472 Bayerische Landesanstalt fu¨ r Boden-
kultur und Pflanzenbau an das Bayerische Staatsministerium fu¨ r ELF – Bericht zur
mikrobiologischen Antibiotika-Analytik 1973 (01.02.1974), p. 1.
109 HSTA MELF-173d (vorla¨ufig) 7132/1766 Der Hessische Minister fu¨ r Landesent-
wicklung, Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Forsten an Herrn Landwirtschaftsattache´
Holger Bunk Dybdahl, Staatskonsulat Kg. Dansk Ambassade (30.10.1970), p. 2;
MELF-173b (vorla¨ufig), 7132/1587 Bayerisches Landesamt fu¨ r Erna¨hrungs-
wirtschaft, Bericht u¨ ber die amtliche Futtermittelkontrolle im Kalenderjahr 1975
(24.02.1976), p. 3.
110 HSTA MELF-173c (vorla¨ufig), 7132/1677 BMELF an die Minister und Senatoren
fu¨ r ELF (10.11.1977), p. 5; West Germany had already supported EEC AGP licensing
for Hoechst’s Flavomycin; HSTA MELF-173c (vorla¨ufig) 7132/1659 BMELF an Nie-
dersa¨chsischen Minister fu¨ r ELF – Anhang 1 Auszug aus dem Bericht u¨ ber die
29. Sitzung des Sachversta¨ndigenausschusses 06–07.09.1976 (03.06.1977).
www.sciencedirect.comDescribed by Ulrike Thoms, the Redlefsen KG was subse-
quently sued and forced to end Reinschmecker sales by
competitors fearing for the image of their own products.111
However, the Reinschmecker-case did not end the organic
boom and press articles continued to praise non-intensive-
ly farmed meat and ‘‘poison and chemical free agricultural
products.’’112 In 1981, the Catalyst-Group published the
popular Chemie in Lebensmitteln (chemicals in food), which
provided consumers with information on foodstuffs’ ingre-
dients and how to avoid Chemie-exposure. Antibiotics
featured prominently in the book.113
With sales of ‘‘pure’’ food booming and Chemie-fears
peaking in the years following the 1976 dioxin disaster in
Seveso,114 West Germans continued to marginalise the
hazard of bacterial resistance selection on farms. Titled
‘‘Are the farmers poisoning us? Chemie in agricul-
ture,’’115 a 1978 Spiegel issue featured a gasmask-wear-
ing farmer sowing a field (Fig. 2). According to the
Spiegel, mass-use of pesticides, antibiotics, and herbi-
cides by Chemie-farmers was laying the table for Ger-
mans’ ‘‘last supper’’116 (Henkersmahlzeit). Once again,
antibiotics featured less as a selector for microbial resis-
tance than as an invisible adulterant. Similar reports
continued to appear throughout the German media dur-
ing 1980s.117 Concerns about the risk posed by ‘‘infec-
tious resistance’’ continued to be displaced by a
vernacular risk emphasis on residues.
Unsurprisingly, heightened public Chemie criticism
increased conflicts with West German farmers. Despite
often harboring private health concerns, the majority of
farmers felt that there was no alternative to chemical-
dependent intensification.118 This was also true for agri-
cultural antibiotics. While farming magazines stigma-
tized farmers caught abusing veterinary drugs as
‘‘fixers’’119 and criticized antibiotic use to compensate
substandard production methods, they encouraged111 Thoms, ‘Between Promise and Threat. Antibiotics in Foods in West Germany
1950–1980’, pp. 200–01; on organic agriculture see: Frank Ueko¨tter, Die Wahrheit Ist
Auf Dem Feld. Eine Wissensgeschichte Der Deutschen Landwirtschaft (Go¨ttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), pp. 413–17, Warren J. Belasco, Appetite for Change.
How the Counterculture Took on the Food Industry (2nd edn.; Ithaca and New York:
Cornell University Press 2007), pp. 68–69, Kirchhelle, Pyrrhic Progress. Antibiotics
and Western Food Production (1949–2013).
112 ‘Horn und Erna¨hrung’, Spiegel (46/1971), p. 67; cf. also: Sybil Gra¨fin Scho¨nfeldt,
‘Antibiotische ‘saure Nieren’’, Zeit (39/1973), p. 61; ‘Zeitlese – Glu¨ cksschwein’, Zeit (9/
1989), p. 87; Horst Dohm, ‘Zehn Quadratmeter Wiese fu¨ r jedes Huhn’, FAZ,
03.04.1980, p. 14; Peter Bru¨ gge, ‘Das vergiftete Paradies’, Spiegel (44/1978), p. 100.
113 Katalyse-Umweltgruppe Ko¨ln, Chemie in Lebensmitteln (Ko¨ln: Zweitausendeins,
1982), pp. 11–13.
114 Frank Ueko¨tter and Claas Kirchhelle, ‘Wie Seveso Nach Deutschland Kam.
Umweltskandale Und O¨kologische Debatten Von 1976 Bis 1986.’, Archiv fu¨ r Sozial-
geschichte, 52 (2012), pp. 333–34.
115 ‘Vergiften uns die Bauern?’, Spiegel (44/1978).
116 Peter Bru¨ gge, ‘Das vergiftete Paradies’, Spiegel (44/1978), p. 99.
117 ‘Hauptsache es hilft und fa¨llt nicht auf’, Spiegel (44/1980), pp. 112–119; ‘Mengen
von illegalen Tierarzneimitteln’, FAZ, 28.10.1981, p. 9; ‘Tierarzneimittel fu¨ r Millionen
illegal verkauft’, FAZ, 15.09.1984, p. 7; Reiner Klingholz, ‘Schweinerei im Ka¨lberstall’,
Zeit (34/1988), p. 1.
118 ‘Dobler greift Verbraucher Arbeitsgemeinschaft an’, LWWL (04/1974), p. 12;
‘Landwirte fu¨ rchten die Folgen der verscha¨rften Umweltschutzbestimmungen’,
LWWL (03/1974), p. 10; Seidl, Deutsche Agrargeschichte, pp. 293–94; on private health
fears see Ilse Witte, ‘Wohin fu¨ hrt uns der technische Fortschritt?’, LWWL (45/1973), p.
9); Anna Brunner, ‘Gift ist keine Lo¨sung’, LWWL (31/1970), p. 5; Reinold Dohmann,
‘Vergiften wir uns selbst?’, LWWL (42/1973), p. 6; ‘Gift ist keine Lo¨sung’, BLW (31/
1970), p. 5; Eisenmann, ‘Nur keine ‘Chemie’ ins Bier’, BLW (48/1975), p. 12.
119 ‘O¨strogenmast wurde ein teurer Spaß’, LWWL (2/1973), p. 16; ‘Neuer Schlag gegen
Tiera¨rzte’, BLW (50/1975), p. 12; ‘So kann kranken Mastschweinen ha¨ufig geholfen
werden’, LWWL (05/1976), p. 31.
123 Quoted according to ‘Liebe Leser’, BLW (14/1980), p. 2.
124 ‘Die Killer Story’, BLW (27/1980), p. 11; ‘Verunsicherte Verbraucher – diskrimi-
nierte Landwirte’, BLW (16/1980), p. 4.
125 ‘Giftmischer’, BLW (22/1980), p. 11.
126 Links between Western fears of ‘invisible’ contamination by chemicals and radio-
activity have been pointed out by numerous authors, Ralph H. Lutts, ‘Chemical
Fallout: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, Radioactive Fallout, and the Environmental
126 Endeavour Vol. 40 No. 2antibiotic use to optimize management and defeat dis-
eases.120
Tensions between West German farmers and the wider
public peaked during the early 1980s. On New Year’s Eve
1979, the Bavarian Broadcasting Service (Bayerischer
Rundfunk, BR) caused a uniquely German scandal by
broadcasting the Biermo¨sl Blosn’s ‘‘evening prayer of the
modern farmer’’ (Nachtgebet des modernen Landwirts).
The song was a persiflage of the Bavarian hymn (Bayern-
lied):
God be with you, you land of the BayWa, German
fertilizer of phosphate
Over your wide-open fields lies Chemie from early
morning to late at night
And this is how your beets grow and you feed your
sow.
Dear Lord stay in heaven, we have Nitrophoska
Blue!121
Bavaria’s farming community was outraged and
demanded a full apology from the BR.122 However, three
months later, Klaus Peter Schreiner published a further
persiflage of a popular children’s song in the widely read
Su¨ ddeutsche Zeitung:
In March the farmer starts the tractor
and sprays the field assiduously and tenaciously
no small caterpillar, no small plant survives the
poison,
in the forest, the stomach of the small bird rises.
In Summer the farmer empties his sack
fertilizes the fruits of which one eats
he knows how to fertilize by heart
from Bayer, von Hoechst and from BASF.
In Autumn the farmer thanks animal medicine120 ‘Nichts dem Zufall u¨ berlassen’, BLW (02/1970) (special supplement), p. 23; ‘Anti-
biotika gegen Milchfieber bei Schweinen’, BLW (40/1970), p. 6.
121 W.N., ‘Chemie, Chemie’, BLW (02/1980), p. 11.
122 ‘Protest gegen BayWa Hymne’, BLW (07/1980), p. 8; the BR subsequently appar-
ently imposed a broadcasting ban on the Biermo¨sl Blosn; the band later caused
another scandal by accidently being engaged to play at the annual strong beer festival
(Starkbierfest) of the conservative Bavarian Christian Social Union, ‘Ein Trio gegen
die Tu¨ melei’, Zeit (22/1987), p. 51.
www.sciencedirect.comBecause of penicillin, the milk does not turn sour
The Pigs are lean and long as never before
to the honor of animal pharmacology.
In Winter the farmer takes his checkbook
with wife and child he climbs into the Mercedes
He drives into the county town—he is not stupid
and shops in the organic Reformhaus—he knows
exactly why.123
Playing on the popular link between antibiotics, Che-
mie, and Gift, the persiflage prompted farming magazines
to complain about an ‘‘evil ‘poison campaign’ of the pub-
lic’’124 and publish lyrical counterattacks. Following fur-
ther criticism of veterinary drugs on national TV, an
agricultural commentator bemoaned the endless stream
of depictions of ‘‘the farmer as a destructor of the environ-
ment and poisoner (Vergifter) of food.’’125
In many ways, the controversies of 1980 reveal the extent
to which Chemie criticism had become the cornerstone of
West German protest against intensive agriculture. For
activists, the rhetoric umbrella of Chemie enabled the si-
multaneous criticism of chemically distinct substances like
antibiotics, hormones, pesticides, herbicides, and fertilisers.
Chemie’s invisible and poisonous image also enabled pow-
erful analogies to contemporary mass protests against nu-
clear energy and growing fears about the Waldsterben.126
However, the power of Chemie-focused criticism also
meant that West German measures against bacterial re-
sistance proliferation remained half-hearted. The growing
international risk episteme surrounding resistance prolif-
eration failed to effectively ‘‘stage’’ bacterial resistance and
penetrate West Germans’ vernacular risk discourse.
Whereas Sweden pioneered a complete AGP ban because
of resistance concerns in 1986, West German authorities
continued to limit antibiotic hazards to a ‘‘Gift in meat
problem.’’127 Because regulating this ‘‘Gift problem’’ main-
ly entailed enforcing withdrawal times, it was both easier
and politically more rewarding to tackle than controversialMovement’, Environmental Review, 9/3 (1985), Kendra Smith-Howard, Pure and
Modern Milk. An Environmental History since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), Schwerin, ‘Vom Gift Im Essen Zu Chronischen Umweltgefahren. Lebensmit-
telzusatzstoffe Und Die Risikopolitische Institutionalisierung Der Toxikogenetik in
Der Bundesrepublik, 1955–1964’.
127 HSTA MInn (vorla¨ufig) 5580 BA 2 Hemmstoffe – O¨strogene, Thyreostatika in
Lebensmitteln, Verfu¨ gung A; 10.1, Gottfried Wolff to Ltd. Ministerialrat Dr. Hans
Schiedermaier (03.10.1972); a 1989 DFG ad hoc group on resistance had no effect on
agricultural practice ‘Senatskommission Zur Pru¨ fung Von Ru¨ cksta¨nden in Lebens-
mitteln’, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Jahresbericht (Bonn, 1988).
Endeavour Vol. 40 No. 2 127antibiotic restrictions. This did not mean that Germans
were unafraid of bacterial resistance proliferation in agri-
cultural settings. Rather, resistance fears paled in com-
parison to the specter of invisible Chemie in milk, food, and
bodies.128
Conclusion
In the end, West Germany never effectively addressed
agricultural antibiotics’ selection for bacterial resistance.
With consumers and farmers embroiled in Chemie-conflicts,
rising levels of bacterial resistance remained an elephant in
the room. Everybody was aware of it but nobody cared
enough to priorities it as a risk and regulatory issue.
Real change occurred only after reunification with East
Germany where researchers like Wolfgang Witte were al-
ready warning about resistance selection on farms.129 Dur-
ing the 1990s, the BSE crisis and resistance against reserve
antibiotics forced Europeans to reform agricultural antibi-
otic policies. In 1994, Germany supported the EU’s ban of
chloramphenicol AGPs. One year later, reports of cross-
resistance between avoparcin and the reserve antibiotic
vancomycin prompted Germany, Denmark, and the
Netherlands to veto a British re-licensing request for avo-
parcin dairy cow feeds. Germany subsequently followed
Denmark’s suit in banning avoparcin AGPs in 1996 and
supported a 1997 EU ban. With Scandinavian countries
pressing for further antibiotic restrictions, the EU decided
to phase out virginiamycin, avilamycin, salinomycin-
natrium, and flavophospholipol AGPs by July 1999.130
The grace period for the four remaining AGPs did not last
long. The 2001 confirmation of BSE in German herds
resulted in a national crisis and a Green Minister of Agri-
culture who promptly announced an agricultural turn-
around (Agrarwende) and supported further antibiotic
bans at the European level. Two years later, EU Directive
Nr. 1831/2003 led to the phasing out of remaining AGPs by
January 2006.
Although the era of antibiotic growth promotion has
ended, therapeutic antibiotics remain popular on German
farms. Their use is also more widespread than previously
thought. Recent data collection reforms have revealed that
Germans used 1706 tons of agricultural antibiotics
in 2011—the highest amount in Europe.131 Although
agricultural antibiotic use has since fallen to 1452 tons128 Early examples of agricultural resistance-focussed criticism are Rainer Flo¨hl, ‘Die
‘Problem-Infektion’ und die Antibiotika’, FAZ, 14.11.1973, p. 33; ‘Resistente Salmo-
nellen in der Nahrungskette’, FAZ, 03.10.1984, p. 33.
129 Ruth Hummel, H Tscha¨pe, and Wolfgang Witte, ‘Spread of Plasmid Mediated
Nourseothricin Resistance Due to Antibiotic Use in Animal Husbandry’, Journal of
Basic Microbiology, 26 (1986).
130 Dettenkofer, M.; Ackermann, M.; Eikenberg, M.; Merkel, H., Auswirkungen Des
Einsatzes Von Antibiotika Und Substanzen Mit Antibiotischer Wirkung in Der Land-
wirtschaft Und Im Lebensmittelsektor. Ein Literatur-Review (Erna¨hrungs Wende
Produkte, Materialienband Nr. 4; Freiburg: Institut fu¨ r Umweltmedizin und Kran-
kenhaushygiene am Universita¨tsklinikum Freiburg, 2004), p. 24 & 27; Helmut
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deutschland-ist-spitzenreiter-bei-antibiotika-einsatz-in-tiermast-a-858092.html
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www.sciencedirect.comin 2013, larger amounts of less potent antibiotics have been
substituted with smaller amounts of more potent—and
therapeutically valuable—fluoroquinolones.132
In this situation, the history of antibiotic use has lessons
to offer. With bacterial resistance continuing to rise and
the pipeline for new antibiotics stalling, regulators will
have to reduce antibiotic dependency in both medicine and
food production. Despite being invaluable therapeutics, it
seems dubious to subsidize the development of new anti-
biotics if these will merely serve as temporary plugs for a
leaking ship. Instead of focusing on technical fixes, regu-
lators will have to redress the cultural root causes of
antibiotic overuse in Western medicine and food produc-
tion. With over half of global antibiotics used in agricul-
ture,133 changes in current farming practices are necessary
if global antibiotic use is to fall. Moreover, it will not be
enough to reduce antibiotic use unilaterally—bacterial
resistance knows no borders. Although the 1960s Swann
bans and contemporary EU bans had important signal
effects, only binding international treaties on reductions
of antibiotic use will be able to preserve existing and future
antibiotics’ efficacy.
Such a consensus will be difficult to reach. As has been
shown for West Germany, there is nothing ‘‘natural’’ about
being more concerned about bacterial resistance than
about antibiotic residues in food. As highlighted by Ulrich
Beck, knowing about a risk is not the same as being
sufficiently afraid to regulate it. Instead, the successful
cultural ‘‘staging’’ of a risk by experts, activists, and policy
makers as well as a risk’s successful adoption into con-
sumers’ and producers’ vernacular risk repertoire is deci-
sive for the creation of sustained societal action. In the case
of agricultural antibiotics, future regulators will have to do
more than merely state the all too familiar ‘‘facts’’ about
antibiotic resistance to convince governments to reduce
antibiotic use. Instead, they will have to learn and speak in
the language of individual risk cultures before being able to
successfully ‘‘stage risk’’ and convince consumers, farmers,
and officials that substance restrictions are in their long-
term self-interest. The nature of this challenge is not only
scientific but also cultural.
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